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Abstract
An individual’s decision about how much to save depends on her
perception of how current savings aﬀects future well-being. Fatalistic
individuals believe that they have little or no control over future out-
comes. We develop a theoretical model linking fatalism to savings and
test the predictions using data from the National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth (NLSY). The model predicts that fatalism decreases savings
for moderately risk averse individuals, but actually increases savings
for highly risk averse individuals. Furthermore, fatalism decreases ef-
fort in learning about savings and investment options. The empirical
results support the theoretical predictions of the model and are robust
to the inclusion of a number of additional control variables.
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1 Introduction
Fatalism, the notion that individuals believe that they lack the ability to
determine their outcomes, is an important phenomenon in modern society.
In the 1992 round of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 11% of
individuals agree or strongly agree with the statement "I have little control
over the things that happen to me".1 In this paper, we develop an economic
model of fatalism and apply it to a still open question in the economics
literature: why do people save so little?
A large body of evidence shows that many households do not save op-
timally and enter retirement with little or no savings (Lusardi 2001, Choi,
Laibson, and Madrian 2004, and Banks, Blundell and Tanner 1998). The
savings decision clearly depends on one’s perception of the future and one’s
perception of how his or her current actions aﬀect the future. Amidst the
current economic downturn, these perceptions have become more important,
as the misbehavior of financial institutions and credit ratings agencies have
increased doubts about the the usefulness of gathering information and ad-
vice from experts.
We examine a simple theoretical model in which consumers choose both
savings and eﬀort to improve their investment portfolio. Fatalism is mod-
eled as a belief that the returns to eﬀort are lower than the actual market
returns. We find that fatalism will decrease savings, but only for individuals
with suﬃciently low risk aversion. For more risk averse people, fatalism will
actually increase savings. In addition, fatalism will unambiguously decrease
eﬀort. We test these hypotheses using data from the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth (NLSY) and find general support for the model.
There is a large literature analyzing fatalism, mostly in disciplines outside
of economics. In epidemiology, there is evidence that those who are most at
risk for certain diseases are often the least likely to get preventive screens for
them (Kash and Dabney (2001) and Wu (2003)). In disaster preparedness,
McClure, Allen and Walkey (2001) show that people are less likely to prepare
for earthquakes and other disasters if they believe that their preparedness
levels will not have a meaningful eﬀect on the expected damages that actually
occur. In political science, Goodwin and Allen (2000) demonstrate strong
relationships among fatalism, attitudes toward democracy, and democratic
participation in several republics of the former Soviet Union. The common
1This figure is based on the authors’ tabulations of data used for this study.
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theme among these studies is that those with fatalistic tendencies believe
that their current and past actions have limited or no eﬀect in determining
future outcomes, and their choices reflect this.
Within the economics literature, the concept of fatalism has been used
to explain diﬀerences between the U.S. and Europe. Alesina and Angeletos
(2005) show how a system with more (less) redistribution can arise when
individuals are less (more) likely to believe that eﬀort determines income.
Benabou and Tirole (2006) relate fatalism to the psychology literature and
the notion of a “belief in a just world” (Lerner 1982) in order to examine the
interaction between ideology and redistribution systems. Wu (2005) finds
evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances that those who believe luck
plays an important part in their financial aﬀairs are less likely to save. Kimball
and Shumway (2009) demonstrate that there is a strong negative correlation
between a measure of fatalism and savings in a survey they conducted. We
use a model to understand this correlation in detail in the NLSY, showing
that high risk aversion may reverse the result.
Our work also ties in to the growing literature on why consumers save
so little. Several papers suggest that households aren’t well informed about
benefits (e.g. Gustman and Steinmeier (2005)) and that financial education
can stimulate savings (Bernheim and Garrett (2003) and Duflo and Saez
(2003)). Other models, such as Allen and Carroll (2001) and Reis (2004),
argue that financial planning is too costly. Many recent papers use behav-
ioral arguments to explain under-saving. Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman
(1998) and Diamond and Koszegi (2003) use hyperbolic discounting to for-
mally model the self-control problem in relation to the empirical findings on
household savings behavior and Madrian and Shea (2001) show that default
options drive individual saving behavior.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical model.
Section 3 explains the data and empirical methodology. Section 4 discusses
the empirical results and section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a simple savings problem in which there are two periods. In period
one, consumers choose an amount to save and make an eﬀort that influ-
ences future returns. In period two, the returns are realized and consumers
consume their savings. We write this formally as a maximization problem:
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max ( − )−
1
2
2 + {(+ )() + (1− (+ ))()}
where  is the discount factor,  is period one income, and  is the
minimum probability that there will be a high return  to savings (and
1−  is the maximum probability that there is a low return to savings ).
The choice variables of the consumer are savings () and eﬀort (), where
 ∈ [0 1− ]. The utility function (·) is assumed to be increasing and concave.
A larger eﬀort can increase the probability of receiving a high return on
savings. Larger eﬀort is costly, however, and must be exerted in period one.
For simplicity, we assume that eﬀort is separable in the period one utility
function and that the cost of eﬀort is quadratic. Investment in eﬀort may
occur in a number of ways. It could involve direct planning for the future
through investigating diﬀerent investment opportunities, hiring a financial
consultant, or using computer software to analyze investing needs. In addi-
tion, an individual may acquire more education or training such as taking
investment related courses or attending financial planning seminars.
Fatalism is defined as the belief that one has little control over future
actions, i.e. luck, rather than personal actions, determines one’s fate. In
terms of the model, a fatalist is someone who perceives or believes that the
return to eﬀort is lower than it truly is. The parameter  measures the
returns to eﬀort and hence fatalism is represented by a  less than the actual
return .2 Individuals with low ’s believe they have less control over the
probabilities that will influence their future outcomes than they actually do.
This may be because they believe that financial planning is not eﬀective, that
returns to savings and investment have little variability, or that the returns
are unpredictable.
The consumer optimally chooses an eﬀort level and savings amount that
maximizes her utility. We assume that there is a unique optimum, which is
equivalent to assuming that for all parameters:
−00( − )− {(+ )200() + (1− (+ ))200()} (A1)
−({0()−0()})2  0
2Benabou and Tirole (2006) also take the approach of using the returns to eﬀort to
capture individual ability to determine one’s future, but they are concerned with how this
return is learned (from outcomes) and transmitted (through parents) over time.
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The optimal solution (∗ ∗) is given by the two first order conditions:3
−∗ + {(∗)− (∗)} = 0
−0( − ∗) + {(+ ∗)0(∗) + (1− (+ ∗))0(∗)} = 0
The consumers’ degree of risk aversion will be an important part of
understanding the results. Label the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion
 = −00()0() . The following lemma is a step that is necessary for de-
scribing the solution.
Lemma 1 (i) If 0    1 for all , then 0()−0()  0.
(ii) If   1 for all , then 0()−0()  0.
Proof. First, suppose 0    1 for all . This implies that
−00()
0()  1 for all , or 0() + 00()  0. The second expres-
sion is equivalent to (0())  0, which gives the result. We can use a
similar argument for the second result.
Now we examine the eﬀects of fatalism on the choices of savings and
eﬀort. We refer to a “rational” consumer as one who knows the true rate of
return to eﬀort.
Proposition 2 Given that assumption A1 holds,
(i) Fatalists invest strictly less eﬀort than rational consumers.
(ii) If 0    1 for all , Fatalists save less than rational consumers.
If   1 for all , Fatalists save more than rational consumers.
(iii) Risk neutral and risk loving fatalists save the same amount as rational
consumers.
Proof. Define  ( ) to be the left hand side of equation A1 and  () =
0()−0().
For all of the results we use the implicit function theorem on the equation:
−0( − ∗) + {(+ ∗(∗;  )))0(∗)
+(1− (+ ∗(∗;  )))0(∗)} = 0
3Note that borrowing, or   0, would be possible if we assumed there was period two
exogenous income. We have assumed it away for simplicity.
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where (;  ) = {(∗)− (∗)}.
The results for a change in the fatalism parameter are:
∗
 =
2 ()
 ( ) 
∗
 = {(
∗)− (∗)}+  ()
∗

It is clear that when 0    1 holds, Lemma 1 implies that  ()  0
and consequently both ∗  0 and ∗  0. Similarly, when when   1
holds,  ()  0, implying that ∗  0 and ∗  0.
Lastly, risk neutral consumers have linear utility and therefore the choice
of savings either hits the lower bound of 0 or the upper bound of . This
doesn’t (locally) depend on fatalism. Risk loving consumers also hit a corner
solution as the interior solution minimizes their utility.
Fatalists unambiguously invest less eﬀort than rational consumers since
they have a lower perceived return to eﬀort. The impact of fatalism on
savings, however, depends on the degree of risk aversion of the consumer.
Risk neutral and risk loving individuals either save all of their income or
none of it. Therefore varying perceptions over the return to eﬀort don’t aﬀect
their savings. For risk averse individuals, who have an interior solution and
save a fraction of their income, the degree of fatalism matters. Consider
lowering the perceived returns to eﬀort (and holding eﬀort fixed). There
are two competing eﬀects influencing an individual’s savings choice. The
first is the fact that expected returns to savings are lower, so a consumer
would want to save less. The second is the fact that the low outcome in the
second period is more likely to occur. A risk averse individual would thus
like to save more in order to smooth income between the states in period two.
Therefore, for moderately risk averse consumers (who have 0    1),
the first eﬀect dominates and being fatalistic means that they want to save
less so as to avoid the low return to savings. On the other hand, for very
risk averse consumers (who have   1), the second eﬀect dominates and
being fatalistic means that they want to save more to better smooth their
income.
A few caveats apply here. First, we have not fully characterized all con-
sumers, as it may be possible that a consumer has 0    1 for some
levels of savings, and   1 for other levels. Even the most sophisticated
survey questions have not been able to solicit a diﬀerence like this, so we will
leave this issue on the sidelines. Second, there is a long-standing struggle
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in the macroeconomics and finance literatures to distinguish the coeﬃcient
of relative risk aversion from the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.4
Indeed, for power preferences (i.e. () = ) they are the inverse of one
another. They are also the inverse of each other for time separable, homo-
thetic preferences. We have assumed time separability, but haven’t assume
homotheticity, so indeed they may be diﬀerent in our model.
3 Data and Methodology
The primary data used for this study are derived from the 1979 National Lon-
gitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79), a survey of young men and women born
between the years 1957-1964. This survey gathers information at multiple
points in time on the labor market activities, outcomes, and other significant
life events of respondents. We use this data because it is one of the only
data sets that combines information about: (1) attitudinal variables such as
perceived degree of control over one’s situations and optimism towards life;
(2) risk preferences; (3) the propensity to save; and (4) eﬀort spent planning
for retirement. Although this is a panel survey, many of the key variables of
interest for this study are only asked in a particular wave. Therefore, we
will treat the data as one cross-section. Aside from the demographic char-
acteristics, most of the other variables of interest are taken from the most
recent round of the survey conducted in 2006, though the measure of fatalism
is taken from an earlier wave (1992).5 There are slightly over 4,000 individ-
uals with non-missing information for most variables, though only a subset
of the respondents answered questions regarding retirement and retirement
planning.
Our first prediction of the model is that fatalistic individuals are less
likely to spend time and eﬀort in making savings and investment decisions.
Although the NLSY does not contain any variables that exactly measure the
degree to which individuals spend eﬀort in making general financial decisions,
there are a couple of variables related to the eﬀorts spent on retirement
planning, and these questions are asked to a subset of the sample. Therefore,
we estimate the following probit equation:
4For example, see Giuliano and Turnovsky (2003).
5The fact that the fatalism measure is not concurrent with our dependent variables has
the benefit of reducing the reverse causality problem.
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 (eﬀort = 1) = 0 + 1fatalism + 2 + 
In this equation, our proxy for eﬀort is taken from the respondent’s answer
to the following question from the NLSY: “People begin learning about and
preparing for retirement at diﬀerent ages and in diﬀerent ways. Have you
[or] [Spouse/partner’s name] ever calculated how much retirement income
you would need at retirement?” We estimate a regression where the depen-
dent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the individual responds
“yes” to this question. We also conduct a similar regression where the depen-
dent variable is the answer to the question “Have you [or] [Spouse/partner’s
name] read any magazines or books on retirement planning?”
To measure fatalism, we use the answer to the following question in the
NLSY, “I have little control over the things that happen to me.”6 Respon-
dents can answer along a 1-4 scale, ranging from “strongly disagree” to
“strongly agree”, where higher values represent a higher degree of fatalism.7
The vector X represents a set of demographic and economic variables that
include age, race, gender, marital status, number of children, education, and
self-reported health status. One might argue that those that are fatalistic
may have a more negative outlook on life, which could explain the lack of
eﬀort in planning for the future. To distinguish fatalism from a general sense
of pessimism, we also include a variable that represents how strongly survey
respondents agree or disagree with the statement “I take a positive attitude
toward myself”. Our theoretical model predicts that the coeﬃcient 1 will
be negative since fatalists are less likely to engage in any eﬀort to learn about
saving and investment options.
The second hypothesis that we test is how fatalism aﬀects an individual’s
propensity to save. Thus, we estimate the following equation:
_ = 0 + 1+ 2 + 
Recall that the results of our model imply that correlation between fa-
talism and the propensity to save depends on one’s risk preferences. The
NLSY asks the following question about preferences towards risk: "Suppose
you have been given an item that is either worth nothing or worth $10,000.
6This is one of the questions used in the NLSY from what is known as the Pearlin
Mastery Scale, which measures individuals perceptions about themselves and the world.
7Although the regressions shown in the tables include the fatalism variable linearly,
using separate indicator variables for the diﬀerent categories yields similar results.
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Tomorrow you will learn what it is worth. There is a 50-50 chance it will be
worth $10,000 and a 50-50 chance it will be worth nothing. You can wait to
find out how much the item is worth, or you can sell it before its value is
determined. What is the lowest price that would lead you to sell the item
now rather than waiting to see what it is worth?" For this question, holding
all else constant, lower values imply a greater degree of risk aversion, while a
value of $5,000 would imply an individual is risk neutral. Because a response
of zero indicates an infinitely risk averse person and a response of 10,000 in-
dicates an infinitely risk loving person, we trim the sample to exclude those
with responses at these very extremes.8
We use the response to this question to create two diﬀerent measures of
risk preferences. Our first is a simple one: we separate the sample into indi-
viduals that require more than $5,000 (risk loving), individuals that require
between $3,000 and $5,000 (moderately risk averse), and those that require
less than $3,000 (very risk averse). Our second measure explicitly calculates
the cutoﬀ RRA=1 for each individual. We do this using the individual’s
reported wealth and the assumption that individuals have constant relative
risk aversion. Specifically, having constant RRA=1 implies having log-utility.
It is easy to show that an individual with log utility and assets  will answer
the risk question with the dollar amount
p( + 10 000)−. Therefore if
an individual with assets  answers a number lower than this amount, we
classify them as having RRA1, and if an individual with assets  answers a
larger amount (but less than or equal to 5,000) we classify them as having an
RRA between 0 and 1. We keep the classification of risk loving individuals
as those who answer more than $5,000.
We then use OLS to estimate separate regressions for each of the groups
using each diﬀerent measure, where the dependent variable is equal to the
percentage of money one would save if he or she received the amount of
money specified in the response to the question discussed above (somewhere
between 0 and $10,000). The measure of fatalism is the same as before and
similar demographic controls are included.
There are a few remarks about the data that we must make. Although
a response of $5,000 should correspond to someone who is exactly risk neu-
tral, we include these "borderline" individuals in the moderately risk averse
category. The reason is that the great majority of people respond with this
8Results for the entire sample (including those individuals at the two extremes) are
qualitatively similar, though the coeﬃcients are less precisely estimated.
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precise answer and other research shows that the great majority of individu-
als are moderately risk averse. A study by Dohmen et al. (2005) finds that
78 percent of the subjects of their experiment are risk averse. In Barsky,
Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro (1997), 87.2% of the sample is risk averse.
Guiso and Paiella (2008) have a sample with 96% self-reporting positive risk
aversion. Chetty (2006) also finds that most individuals have RRA between
0 and 1. Given that over 60 percent of our sample answers $5,000 for this
question, including this group in the risk loving/risk neutral category seems
inappropriate.
For the asset variable, a number of people report negative or zero assets.
Because we cannot use the risk question to estimate a coeﬃcient of RRA
for those with zero or negative wealth, we add the amount of money they
would be willing to receive today (the answer to the "risk" question) to
assets and then calculate rates of relative risk aversion using this amount of
wealth. This is reasonable given that the savings question assumes that the
individual has been given the amount in the answer to the "risk" question
already.9 We then drop individuals who still have zero or negative wealth
after this adjustment and also include as a control variable an indicator for
"zero or negative wealth", where this is equal to one if the unadjusted wealth
is zero or negative.
Although the NLSY is a panel survey, this question on fatalism is not
asked in other years. Thus, it is diﬃcult to determine whether a change in
an individual’s perception of control has a causal impact on that same indi-
vidual’s attitudes toward saving and saving habits. However, the argument
for reverse causality is not entirely convincing. It seems much more likely
that one’s degree of fatalism would aﬀect her eﬀort towards gathering infor-
mation about savings and the propensity to save, rather than the other way
around. We also address the problem of omitted variable bias by controlling
for economic, demographic and behavioral characteristics as discussed above.
4 Results
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis.
The NLSY samples young individuals who were between the ages of 14-22
in the year 1979. This implies that by the time of the 2006 wave, the age
9We also did a separate version where we add $2,000 to everyones assets and then
discard those at zero or below, and the results are the same.
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range is between 41 and 49 years. Roughly half of the sample is female,
while 60 percent of respondents are married and 23 percent are black. Many
respondents "disagree" or "strongly disagree" with the statement "I have
little control over what happens to me" (mean of 1.81 on a 1-4 scale, where
1 represents "strongly disagree" and 4 represents "strongly agree").
Table 2 presents the results of two probit regressions that predict the
degree of eﬀort people put into planning for retirement. The dependent
variable in the first regression is equal to one if the respondent has ever
calculated the amount of money needed for retirement. Married and more
highly educated people are more likely to have made retirement calculations,
while Hispanics and those in poor health are less likely to have done so. Our
main independent variable of interest is fatalism, or one’s perceived control
over future events. More fatalistic people are less likely to spend eﬀort in
calculating the amount of money necessary for retirement. The coeﬃcient
in column 1 indicates that an increase in one point (along a 4 point scale) in
the degree of perceived fatalism decreases the likelihood of making retirement
calculations by roughly 9 percent. This coeﬃcient is statistically significant
at the 1 percent level.
We get the same result for the second regression in Table 2, which uses
the likelihood of reading books or magazines about retirement planning as
the dependent variable. Column 2 of Table 2 shows that a one point increase
in the level of fatalism decreases an individual’s probability of reading about
retirement by 6.7 percent and this coeﬃcient is significant at the 5 percent
level. These results are consistent with the theoretical prediction of our
model.
We now turn to the savings decision. Recall from our model that the sign
of the coeﬃcient on fatalism depends on the risk preferences of individuals,
and specifically on the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion. To split the sample,
we use the answer to a question that asks respondents the minimum amount
necessary to forgo a 50-50 risk of receiving either $10,000 or nothing. As
discussed above, lower values represent higher degrees of risk aversion. In
Table 3a, we estimate equation 2 for three groups separated by our first
measure for risk aversion: individuals that require more than $5,000 (risk
loving), individuals that require between $3,000 and $5,000 (moderately risk
averse), and those that require less than $3,000 (very risk averse).
Recall that the model predicts that for risk loving individuals, there
should be no eﬀect of fatalism on savings behavior because they are at corner
solutions. The results confirm this claim. Column 1 shows that for risk loving
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individuals, there is no appreciable eﬀect of fatalism on the likelihood of sav-
ing. The point estimate is extremely small and the coeﬃcient is not close to
being statistically significant. Column 2 shows a negative and statistically
significant coeﬃcient for moderately risk averse people (p-value of 0.051).
An increase of one point on the scale of fatalism decreases the propensity
to save by 2.7 percentage points for those that are moderately risk averse.
Finally, we see in column 3 that for highly risk averse people, the relationship
between fatalism and savings is positive. For highly risk averse people, a
one point increase in the scale of fatalism increases the propensity to save by
over 12 percentage points, and this coeﬃcient is significant at the 1 percent
level.
In Table 3b, we incorporate our second measure of risk aversion, where we
calculate using an individual’s assets whether they have an RRA greater than
1 or not. This gives us three categories of people: those with RRA between
zero and one, and those with RRA greater than one, and those who require
more than $5,000 to not take the gamble (risk loving). Once again, the results
strongly support the predictions of the theoretical model. For risk loving
individuals, there is no statistically significant relationship between fatalism
and saving. For moderately risk averse people (RRA between zero and
one), fatalism is negatively correlated with the propensity to save (p-value of
0.06), while for highly risk averse people (RRA greater than one), fatalism
is positively correlated with the propensity to save (p-value of 0.01).10
5 Conclusion
A variety of disciplines including medicine, psychology, sociology and polit-
ical science have shown fatalism to be an important determinant of human
behavior. This paper shows that fatalism can also partly address an impor-
tant question in the economics literature: why do people save so little? We
have developed a theoretical model that predicts that fatalistic people are
less likely to spend time in gathering information about returns to financial
10The results in table 3a and 3b are sensitive to how we categorize those who require
$5,000 to take the gamble. As discussed earlier, we have included them in the moderately
risk averse category. If we instead include them in the risk loving category, fatalism
continues to be statistically insignificant in predicting savings for risk loving individuals.
However, eliminating them from the moderately risk averse category renders the coeﬃcient
on fatalism to be statistically insignificant for this group (though still with a negative sign).
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investments. The sign of the relationship between fatalism and the proba-
bility of saving depends on the risk aversion of consumers. Savings decisions
are not aﬀected by fatalism for risk loving individuals, but for modestly risk
averse individuals (RRA between 0 and 1), fatalism is negatively related
to saving and for highly risk averse individuals (RRA over 1), fatalism is
positively related to saving.
The empirical results support these hypotheses. Specifically, evidence
from the NLSY shows that those who feel they have little control over the
things that happen to them are less likely to engage in retirement planning.
Further, the relationship between fatalism and savings depends on individual
risk preferences as predicted in the model: fatalism is negative correlated with
savings for moderately risk averse individuals and positively correlated with
savings for highly risk averse individuals.
One policy implication is that in an eﬀort to influence savings behavior, it
may be just as important (if not more) to aﬀect people’s perceptions of their
level of control and autonomy as it is to increase their level of information
regarding savings and retirement. Furthermore, the way that information
about saving is presented may be equally or more important than the actual
content. With respect to fatalistic individuals, it may be helpful to provide
indications how saving a little today can lead to much better retirement years
and to show how small actions today can greatly aﬀect the future. The idea
is to get people to believe that they have more “control” of their well being
during future retirement years than they might initially think in order to
combat fatalistic beliefs. As economists continue to incorporate findings in
the psychology literature in modeling savings behavior, policy makers will
be better equipped to address the issues surrounding retirement and the well
being of the elderly.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
                                                                                                                                                                   
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
                                                                                                                                                                   
Married 0.61 0.49
Female 0.49 0.50
Age at time of 2006 Wave 44.74 2.24
Number of Children 1.96 1.43
Black 0.23 0.42
Hispanic 0.13 0.33
Highest Grade Completed 13.33 2.55
Self-Reported Health (1-5 Scale, 5 is excellent health) 2.30 0.99
Optimism (1-4 scale, 4 is most optimistic) 3.39 0.58
Amount of money required to forego 50-50 risk 4,884.51 3,450.69
Percent saved out of money received 49.34 38.11
Assets 174,679 456,071
Have Little Control over Life? (1-4 scale, 4 is most fatalistic) 1.81 0.67
Observations 3,271                                                                                                                                                                   
Table 2: Fatalism and Effort Spent on Retirement Planning
Marginal Effects of Probit Regressions
                                                                                                                                                                                            
Independent Variable Calculated Amount Needed for Retirement? Read Books, Magazines on Retirement?
                                                                                                                                                                                            
Black 0.031 0.099**
(0.043) (0.047)
Hispanic -0.106** -0.078
(0.043) (0.051)
Age  0.012* -0.002
(0.007) (0.008)
Number of Children -0.010 -0.016
(0.012) (0.013)
Female -0.017 -0.031
(0.034) (0.037)
Married 0.110*** 0.048
(0.036) (0.040)
Highest Grade Completed 0.036*** 0.062***
(0.007) (0.008)
Very Good Health -0.031 0.015
(0.043) (0.048)
Good Health 0.004 0.060
(0.049) (0.055)
Fair Health -0.095 0.024
(0.062) (0.078)
Poor Health -0.197** -0.254**
(0.087) (0.111)
Optimism 0.029 0.065**
(0.029) (0.031)
Little Control over Life -0.090*** -0.068**
(0.027) (0.029)
Observations 787 787
Pseudo R-Squared 0.09 0.11
                                                                                                                                                                                            
Notes: Omitted category for health status is excellent.  *Significant at 10% level.  **Significant at 5% level. 
***Significant at 1% level.  Standard errors are in parentheses.
Dependent Variable
Table 3a: Fatalism and Saving
Ordinary Least Squares
Dependent Variable is Percentage of Money Received One Would Save
                                                                                                                                                                                            
Independent Variable Risk Loving Moderately Risk Averse Highly Risk Averse
Value Needed>5000 3000<=Value<=5000 Value<3000
                                                                                                                                                                                            
Black 4.509 -1.000 1.060
(2.771) (2.120) (6.156)
Hispanic 7.136** 5.256** 4.180
(3.422) (2.502) (7.518)
Age  0.744 0.320 0.114
(0.516) (0.361) (1.058)
Number of Children -0.288 -0.809 -1.873
(0.918) (0.624) (1.732)
Female 2.003 1.270 -5.314
(2.308) (1.644) (4.915)
Married 5.905** 0.355 -0.763
(2.648) (1.888) (5.564)
Highest Grade Completed 0.798 0.772** 0.988
(0.521) (0.342) (0.976)
Very Good Health 0.128 -5.782*** -4.606
(3.002) (2.128) (6.213)
Good Health -5.474 -2.918 -8.585
(3.329) (2.402) (7.030)
Fair Health 1.574 -8.660** -29.918**
(5.198) (3.550) (11.668)
Poor Health -8.398 -8.871 11.210
(8.031) (6.168) (24.168)
Optimism -1.368 3.365** 2.697
(2.164) (1.469) (4.169)
Zero_Assets -3.664 -1.947 0.290
(3.193) (2.385) (6.558)
Little Control over Life 0.687 -2.650* 12.445***
(1.802) (1.358) (3.898)
Constant 13.011 25.903 9.935
(25.122) (18.231) (52.396)
Observations 875 2,052 285
R-Squared 0.03 0.02 0.07                                                                                                                                                                                            
Notes: Omitted category for health status is excellent.  *Significant at 10% level.  **Significant at 5% level. 
***Significant at 1% level.  Standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 3b: Fatalism and Saving
Ordinary Least Squares
Dependent Variable is Percentage of Money Received One Would Save
                                                                                                                                                                                                
Independent Variable Risk Loving Moderately Risk Averse Highly Risk Averse
0<=RRA<=1 RRA>1
                                                                                                                                                                                                
Black 4.509 -1.169 0.683
(2.771) (2.134) -5.831
Hispanic 7.136** 5.279** 3.533
(3.422) (2.533) -6.854
Age  0.744 0.376 -0.144
(0.516) (0.365) -0.969
Number of Children -0.288 -0.808 -1.857
(0.918) (0.630) -1.612
Female 2.003 0.749 -0.98
(2.308) (1.668) -4.455
Married 5.905** 0.364 0.197
(2.648) (1.905) -5.192
Highest Grade Completed 0.798 0.800** 0.753
(0.521) (0.348) -0.876
Very Good Health 0.128 -6.262*** -3.142
(3.002) (2.176) -5.429
Good Health -5.474 -3.160 -6.95
(3.329) (2.451) -6.144
Fair Health 1.574 -8.820** -27.012**
(5.198) (3.603) -10.474
Poor Health -8.398 -9.178 10.409
(8.031) (6.182) -23.757
Optimism -1.368 3.384** 3.179
(2.164) (1.495) -3.717
Zero_Assets -3.664 -1.928 -0.798
(3.193) (2.389) -6.426
Little Control over Life 0.687 -2.581* 9.094**
(1.802) (1.378) -3.539
Constant 13.011 23.487 26.304
(25.122) (18.497) -47.579
Observations 875 1,994 343
R-Squared 0.03 0.02 0.05                                                                                                                                                                                                
Notes: Omitted category for health status is excellent.  *Significant at 10% level.  **Significant at 5% level. 
***Significant at 1% level.  Standard errors are in parentheses.
